Policing the Cyber Threat: Exploring the threat from Cyber Crime and the ability of local Law Enforcement to respond by Eze, Thaddeus et al.
 Policing the Cyber Threat 
Exploring the threat from Cyber Crime and the ability of local Law Enforcement to respond 
Matthew Hull 
Computer Science Department 





Computer Science Department 







Computer Science Department 
University of Chester 
United Kingdom 
l.speakman@chester.ac.uk 
Abstract - The landscape in which UK policing operates 
today is a dynamic one, and growing threats such as the 
proliferation of cyber crime are increasing the demand on 
police resources.  The response to cyber crime by national and 
regional law enforcement agencies has been robust, with 
significant investment in mitigating against, and tackling cyber 
threats. However, at a local level, police forces have to deal 
with an unknown demand, whilst trying to come to terms with 
new crime types, terminology and criminal techniques which 
are far from traditional. This paper looks to identify the 
demand from cyber crime in one police force in the United 
Kingdom, and whether there is consistency in the recording of 
crime. As well as this, it looks to understand whether the force 
can deal with cyber crime from the point of view of the Police 
Officers and Police Staff in the organisation. 
Keywords – Cyber; Police; Crime; cyber crime; cyber 
policing 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The true scale and impact of cyber crime is an unknown 
due to issues in how it is reported and the lack of awareness 
about cyber threats and cyber security. 
 
In 2015, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 
(HMIC) said that: 
 
“Those who commit digital crime create victims. Those 
victims demand and deserve the support and help of the 
police, as much as any other victim of crime” 
 
Traditional crime and criminal behaviour is moving 
away from the physical world where the associated risks are 
greater as UK Policing has become adept at tackling such 
criminality. Crime is moving online where it is easier to 
commit offences on much greater scale, with greater ease 
and a reduced risk of being caught. Furthermore, the cost of 
launching a large online criminal campaign, such as the 
distribution of ransomware, is considerably lower than the 
potential return [1]. Thus, cyber crime can be committed on 
an unprecedented scale. 
It is easy for people to become engaged in cyber 
criminality from an early age, drawn in by the challenge and 
thrill of low level criminality and the apparent lack of an 
authoritative presence online [2]. They are also able to take 
advantage of cheap, and sometimes free, easy to use tools 
and techniques to aid their activities which are seen as 
‘cool’. Cyber crime ‘as-a-service’, the ability to hire or 
purchase tools or services which allow individuals with little 
to no technical experience to conduct sophisticated cyber-
attacks, has also had a significant impact on the scale of 
cyber crime [3].  
The research for this paper was initially produced to 
support the ongoing work being conducted within UK 
Policing in order to inform best practice, identify risks and 
identify opportunities to build upon the current strategic 
response to the cyber threat. Furthermore, it sought to 
improve cybersecurity practices. Cybersecurity is not simply 
about the technical ability of individuals or organisations, 
but is more often focused on simple advice and preventative 
measures. It is a key role of the police to provide such 
advice, and investigate instances where cyber security has 
failed. Cyber-attacks are crimes, and ultimately require 
investigating. Policing has to move from a traditional 
‘analogue’ approach to crime investigation to tackle the 
digital threats that are growing in severity and frequency. 
The data for this research is drawn from previous 
literature, a review of crime statistics and a survey of police 
officers and police staff in one of the 43 police forces in 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The aim of this study 
is to improve the way in which local police forces can build 
their capabilities around cyber crime prevention and 
investigation by identifying issues which may be acting as a 
blocker. 
A. Defining Cyber crime 
A question which sparks considerable debate, and has 
done for some time, is ‘What is cyber crime?’ One reason 
for the underreporting of cyber crime is because people 
simply do not understand what it is [4]. It is not difficult to 
see why this is the case when one considers the lack of 
clarity and consistency when it comes to defining cyber 
crime.  
 
Some commentators suggest that cyber crime is nothing 
more than traditional crime committed in a different way. In 
2001 Grabosky said that it is ‘...less a question of something 
completely different than a recognisable crime committed in 
a completely different way’ [5]. For example, driving away 
from a robbery in a car would not necessarily be referred to 
as vehicle crime. 
 
This is a view which is also shared by several other 
leading academics in the field of cyber criminology. They 
say that although there is an increase in ‘cyber crime’, this is 
not necessarily representative of ‘new’ crime types or 
offences that haven’t previously existed [6]. Moreover, so 
called cyber crime when dealt with in the criminal justice 
system is treated no different to, and even ‘feels’ like any 
other traditional crime type [7]. 
 
Ford and Gordon [8] argued that there are two categories 
of cyber crime. They said that the primary factor in the 
commission of the offence is key to the category under 
which the offence sits. If technology, such as computers or 
the internet is the primary factor then the offence sits under 
category 1. This includes offences such as the development 
and spread of malware. Category 2 on the other hand 
includes offences where the primary factor is a ‘human’ 
element, such as online grooming or harassment. This could 
also include the facilitation of existing crime types with the 
assistance of technology. 
 
Cyber crime has no current definition in UK law. 
However, it is widely accepted amongst government and 
law enforcement that cyber crime involves various types of 
criminal activities which make use of IT systems such as 
computers, mobile devices and the internet. With some 
similarities to the work conducted by Ford and Gordon, in 
the UK cyber crime is generally broken down into two 
areas; Cyber Dependent Crime, and Cyber Enabled Crime. 
 
According to the 2010 UK Cyber Crime Strategy, Cyber 
Dependant Crimes are ‘new’ offences, which make use of 
new technologies and techniques [9]. Cyber Dependant 
Crimes rely on IT, networks and/or digital devices to be able 
commit the Actus Reus of an offence. These are ‘true’ cyber 
crimes or ‘pure’, and include things such as hacking, the 
spreading of malicious software (malware), and denial of 
service attacks etc. These types of cyber-attacks are those 
offences which were created by the Computer Misuse Act 
1990. 
 
On the other hand, Cyber Enabled Crimes were defined 
in the same strategy as being traditional crimes, which can 
be increased in scale and reach through the use of 
computers, computer networks, or other forms of 
information communications technology such as mobile 
devices. One of the most common and impactive forms of 
cyber enabled crime in the UK is that of cyber enabled fraud 
[10], which amounts to over 35% of all crime in England 
and Wales. 
 
Despite these two cyber crime ‘types’ appearing in the 
2010 Cyber Crime Strategy, various law enforcement 
agencies and government bodies in the UK make use of 
different definitions of cyber crime. 
 
For example, The Home Office, for crime recording and 
counting purposes do not use the term ‘cyber crime’ and 
refer to ‘Online Crime’. ‘Online Crime’ is defined in ‘The 
Nature of Online Offending’ report which was published in  
2015. It says that an online crime has occurred if… 
 
“…On the balance of probability, the offence was 
committed, in full or in part, through a computer, computer 
network or other computer-enabled device. This included 
sending or receiving emails; use of social networking sites 
such as Facebook, Twitter or chat rooms; use of forums, 
blogs or websites; messaging services such as Blackberry 
Messenger (BBM) and communication via online video 
game networks or Skype. The terms ‘computer, computer 
network and other computer-enabled devices’ include those 
offences committed using: desktop computers or laptops, in 
the home or in the workplace; mobile phones, smartphones, 
tablets and other telecommunications devices linked to 
computer networks; and any other identifiable computer 
system or network that produces, processes and transmits 
data.” 
 
The body which is responsible for the development of 
police learning and skills, the College of Policing has 
produced the ‘Cyber Spectrum’. The cyber spectrum’s 
definitions of cyber enabled and cyber dependent crime are 
consistent with other definitions of these crime types. As 
such, the College of Policing appear to be trying to keep a 
common approach and giving consistent advice to officers. 
However, the cyber spectrum introduces two further terms; 
Internet Facilitated Crime, and Crime with a Digital 
Footprint.  
 
B. The Underreporting of Cyber crime 
 
With the development of computer technology, one of 
the greatest and most significant breakthroughs in terms of 
human evolution [11] we have entered a new cyber age. 
This digital world in which we now live and the various 
elements on which it is built is commonly referred to as the 
cyber landscape.  
 
Technology and the speed at which it is evolving is 
presenting opportunities for people to access data and 
information from anywhere in the world, whenever they 
want, in the palm of their hand without being constrained to 
physical cables or connections[12]. It took 75 years for 50 
million people to start using the telephone after it was 
invented [13]. It took only 4 years for the same number of 
people to start using the World Wide Web after its inception 
in 1989, then only 3 months to reach 50 million users of 
Facebook. 
 
Technology has, unsurprisingly, been embraced by 
criminals who seek new opportunities to commit crime. This 
‘cyber crime’ poses a significant threat internationally and 
here in the UK. In 2010, Gottschalk said that the 
opportunities available to cyber criminals are almost 
endless, and the interconnected world in which we live has 
generated a multitude of new crime types and modus 
operandi, as well as new threat actors [14]. 
 
Although it is difficult to provide a true picture of the 
volume of cyber crime in the UK, experimental figures 
estimate that more than 5.5 million cyber crimes occur in the 
UK each year. Of these, just over two thirds (3.6 million) are 
computer related fraud offences [15]. Despite this being 
experimental data, as it is the first time cyber crime has been 
included in the UK Crime Statistics by the Office for 
National Statistics, it provides a good indication of the 
prevalence of cyber crime in the UK [16]. 
 
The main reason for the incomplete picture is the 
apparent lack of reporting of cyber crime by victims. 
According to McGuire & Dowling this is due in part to 
people not being aware of what cyber crime is, and the 
difficulty in categorising the multitude of crime types and 
associated offences.  
 
The National Crime Agency also sees the underreporting 
of cyber crime as a ‘serious problem’ and that this is 
ultimately hampering the disruption and prosecution of 
cyber criminals [17]. One of the main issues with regards to 
under-reporting is when corporations are the victim of a 
cyber attack. Some businesses might simply be unaware that 
they have been breached, while others might have concerns 
about the reputational damage and lack of customer trust if 
they report being a victim of a cyber attack [18].  
 
To centralise and gain a better picture of the volume of 
cyber crime, the Government launched Action Fraud. Part of 
the City of London Police since 2013, Action Fraud is the 
UK’s national reporting and recording unit for all fraud and 
cyber crime [19]. For crime recording purposes, offences 
under the Fraud Act and the Computer Misuse Act are 
recorded centrally by Action Fraud, and as such do not 
appear on the crime statistics for police forces across the 
country. 
 
Another unit involved in this process is the National 
Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB), which reviews all crime 
reports made to Action Fraud with a view to identifying 
trends, emerging threats, and investigative opportunities. If 
there are such opportunities, details of the report are 
forwarded to the local police for where the suspect or the 
victim (if no suspect is identified) lives for further 
investigation. This in turn ensures that where crime patterns 
are identified, there can be an evaluation and a coordinated 
response on a national level, thereby providing a better 
response to cyber crimes [20]. 
 
However, since its inception and roll-out in 2008, Action 
Fraud has been subject of much controversy and criticism. 
Apart from the name suggesting the body only deals with 
fraud offences, in 2013, Action Fraud cited ‘IT problems’ 
when over 2500 crime reports were lost [21]. The same year, 
the function of Action Fraud was called into question and 
the government was accused of politicising the recording of 
fraud and cyber crime in a process which was regarded as 
defragmented and not conducive to an appropriate call to 
service for victims of cyber crime. 
 
More recently, at the Police Superintendents Association 
of England & Wales conference in September 2017, the 
Deputy Head of the National Cyber Crime Unit, Oliver 
Gower, criticised Action Fraud for the way in which it 
currently operates and that the service to victims is poor 
[22]. He added that there is little to no communication or 
support offered to victims and an even smaller chance that 
victim’s reports will be investigated. Of the estimated 2 
million cyber dependent crimes in the last 12 months, only 
28,000 of those were reported to Action Fraud. Of those, a 
mere 3500 were referred to police forces for further 
investigation. Gower explained that it was this lack of 
response and the poor reputation of the process that causes 
the lack of reporting. Gower did however remind the 
conference that Action Fraud is not the only issue, and that 
of the 3500 referrals, local forces only went on to investigate 







The research for this paper employed two separate data 
collection methods. 
 
Firstly, a review of crime figures and referrals from 
Action Fraud/National Fraud Intelligence Bureau was used 
to identify the current threats to the citizens, businesses and 
organisations in the area subject of the study, and to see 
whether there was any correlation between the demand on 
the force and the general perceptions of the cyber threat in 
the locality. 
 
Crime statistics were obtained from a combination of the 
Forces’ crime recording system (Niche) and Business 
Objects Systems (BOS). These statistics included the details 
of all recorded crime, and crime which was given an ‘online 
crime flag’. It is these statistics which are used to inform the 
national crime recording figures for the Home Office. 
 
As well as looking at the forces crime statistics that are 
provided to the Home Office, the research also considered 
referrals which were received from the National Fraud 
Intelligence Bureau (NFIB). This includes all fraud 
offences, as well as cyber dependent crimes such as hacking 
or denial of service attacks, where NFIB have identified 
possible lines of enquiry and therefore require investigating. 
 
A review of all recorded crimes in the force during the 
review period was also conducted using key word searches 
which looked at the Modus Operandi (MO) of the crime that 
had been recorded. The modus operandi is normally 
provided by the investigating officer when the crime is 
recorded, and details ‘how’ an offence has taken place.  
 
Secondly, a questionnaire was issued to all Police 
Officers and Police Staff in the force to gauge the general 
perceptions of key cyber crime and cyber security topics. To 
provide qualitative data to support the quantitative element 
of this research, a general view of the current impact of 
cyber crime on policing was obtained via open questions 
asking for the participants to give their thoughts. 
 
III. CRIME DATA RESULTS 
 
A. Recorded Crime 
What is apparent from the data obtained is that the issues 
discussed earlier such as the inconsistent approach to 
defining cyber crime, appears to have made the recording 
and reporting of cyber crime inconsistent too. 
 
The data for this part of the research has come from three 
separate sources, yet all appear to give a different picture 
about the demand from cyber related crime. 
 
Having conducted a search of all crimes using a keyword 
search against the modus operandi (MO) of recorded crimes 
between April 2016 and March 2017, 1703 crime incidents 
were identified. These range from malicious 
communications to sexual offences. These crimes are cyber 
enabled, as the Force in question is not required to record 
cyber dependent crime. The following tables give a 
breakdown of the various offences identified from MO 
keyword searching. 
 
Table 1 shows the various offences based on Home 
Office Crime Groups which have been identified in the MO 
keyword search. These are the generic crime types which are 
recorded by the Home Office for statistical purposes. 
 
The predominant crime group which appears to make up 
the bulk of offences is violence against the person. This 
includes offences such as harassment, malicious 
communications as well as physical violence. 
TABLE I.  CRIMES RECORDED BY HOME OFFICE CRIME GROUP 
IDENTIFIED IN MO SEARCH 
Home Office Crime Group   
Violence against the Person 1057 
Sexual Offences 184 
Other Offences 161 
Theft / Handling Stolen Goods 153 
Public Order 96 
Criminal Damage 18 
Burglary 16 
Drug Offences 9 
Vehicle Offences 7 
Possession of Offensive Weapons 1 
Robbery 1 
 
Table 2 shows the top 30 crime types based on their 
Home Office Descriptor. What can be seen is that most of 
the crimes involve malicious communication and 
harassment offences. These almost without exception appear 
to involve social media networks such as Facebook, or 
messaging applications such as WhatsApp in the 
commission of the offence.  
 
The count of sexual offences (n=184) appears from 
Table 2 to be high because of various sexual offences 
against children. Upon reviewing, several of these crimes 
include incidents of online grooming via social media 
networks, as well as the possession and distribution of 
indecent images of children (IIOC) which involve first 
generation images of abuse which has taken place in the 
county. 
 
Blackmail offences also appear high in frequency. 
Except for two offences (blackmail by email following 
business transactions), all the blackmail offences identified 
were sextortion incidents (n=59). Sextortion offences, 
sometimes referred to as webcam blackmail, occur when a 
perpetrator uses a fake identity online in order to persuade 
the victim to perform sexual acts for them using a webcam. 
The acts performed in front of the webcam are recorded by 
the perpetrator who then threatens to share the video with 
the victim’s family and friends. A financial demand is made 
of the victim to stop the perpetrator from distributing the 
video. Sextortion offences present a significant risk as 
victims are extremely vulnerable, and have resulted in 
several victims committing suicide [23]. 
 
Matters which do not appear to be included in the list of 
blackmail offences identified via the MO keyword search 
include five incidents of ‘hacking extortion’ or ‘DDoS 
extortion’, which have been referred by the National Fraud 
Intelligence Bureau (NFIB), following reports to Action 
Fraud. 
 
One such example of DDoS extortion comes following 
an email being received from the hacking group ‘The 
Armada Collective’, who threatened to launch a DDoS 
attack on the victim’s company unless a demand for 1 
Bitcoin is paid. This MO is not uncommon, and The Armada 
Collective have a history of using this tactic, but rarely 
follow through with the attack although victims will often 
pay the demand through fear [24]. 
The recording of Hacking Extortion and DDoS extortion by 
NFIB is unusual in that they are simply blackmail offences, 
and like sextortion, would ordinarily be recorded by the 
Constabulary. It is not clear why Action Fraud would record 
these types of crime, and can only add to the confusion 
around the role of Action Fraud in the recording and 
reporting of crime. 
 
On this topic, one individual responding to the survey 
said: 
 
“Frequently I find it hard to determine where cyber crime 
should be recorded, either locally or via action fraud or 
directly with providers such as banks, internet providers etc. 
This makes it hard to answer questions raised by members 
of the public who contact police for advice and 
reassurance.” 
TABLE II.  COUNT OF CRIMES IDENTIFIED BY MO SEARCH 
Home Office Crime Description   
Malicious Communications 600 
Harassment 357 
Obscene publications etc. 121 
Sexual activity involving a child under 16 79 
Sexual activity involving a child under 13 69 
Blackmail 61 
Public fear, alarm or distress 52 
Other theft 50 
Assault without injury 35 
Other Offences against the state or public order 32 
Assault with Injury 27 
Stalking 20 
Theft in a dwelling other than from automatic 
machine/meter 
12 
Racially or religiously aggravated public fear, 
alarm or distress 
12 
Other notifiable offences 11 
Threat or possession with intent to commit 
criminal damage 
11 
Threats to kill 11 
Theft from the person 10 
Burglary in a building other than a dwelling 9 
Shoplifting 9 
Perverting the course of justice 9 
Rape of a female aged 16 and over 8 
Criminal damage to a dwelling 7 
Exposure and voyeurism 6 
Theft or unauthorised taking of motor vehicle 5 
Possession of controlled drugs (cannabis) 5 
Sexual grooming 5 
Sexual assault on a female aged 13 or over 4 
Assault without injury on a constable 4 
Theft or unauthorised taking of a pedal cycle 4 
Handling stolen goods 4 
 
B. Crimes flagged as being ‘online crime’ 
In comparison to the crimes identified via the MO 
keyword search, crimes that were given an online flag by the 
Force and therefore recorded as national crime statistics, 
appear to be significantly lower in frequency. 
What can be seen is that during the review period the 
crimes identified from the MO search account for 3% of all 
crimes recorded, compared to crimes with an online flag 
which account for less than 1%. 
The monthly figures appear to show that the volume of 
online crime and those identified in the MO keyword search 
are consistent in their volume, however there is on average 
63% fewer online crimes reported to the Home Office. 
There would be an expectation that the two lines of this 
graph would/should be closer together if all ‘online crimes’ 
had been accurately captured. The number of these offences 
is shown as a comparison in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1. Comparison of MO keywords and ‘Online-Flagged’ Crimes 
 
There are several possibilities for this lower number of 
crimes with an online flag. 
Firstly, the MO keyword search is not without its flaws 
in terms of its methodology. Although every care has been 
taken to remove crimes that do not truly reflect a ‘cyber 
crime’ or ‘online’ crime, the number of crimes identified 
could be fewer than the 1703 identified. However, it is 
unlikely that it would be more than 30% less based on the 
manual dip- sample of crimes used to test the methodology. 
Secondly, crimes flagged as being ‘online crime’ are 
done so based on an individual assessing the crime and 
‘flagging’ it where appropriate at the crime recording, 
investigation or closure stage. It may be the case that these 
individuals are not aware of the flagging process, or the 
correct definition of online crime. As the literature research 
suggests, there is much confusion over the definition of 
cyber crime, and if the person responsible for the flagging is 
unaware of the definition, they will not correctly assess the 
crime, and flagging opportunities will be missed. Or indeed, 
crimes will be flagged when there is no ‘cyber’ element. 
 
C. NFIB Referrals 
Of the 592 referrals received from NFIB during the 
review period, only twenty-two were cyber dependent 
crimes. These were broken down as follows in Table III: 
TABLE III.  CYBER DEPENDENT CRIME REFERRALS FROM NFIB 
NFIB Code  Count 
NFIB51A - Denial of Service Attack 2 
NFIB52A - Hacking - Server 5 
NFIB52B - Hacking - Personal 2 
NFIB52C - Hacking - Social Media and Email 7 
NFIB52D - Hacking - PBX / Dial Through 1 
NFIB52E - Hacking Extortion 5 
 
What is significant about this is that this is a very small 
number of criminal investigations over the course of twelve 
months. Despite this, 71% (n=207) of officers and police 
staff said that they deal with cyber dependent crime as part 
of their day job, with 59% (n=173) saying they deal with 
cyber dependent crime ‘frequently’ or ‘occasionally’. 
What must also be noted is that the number of cyber 
dependent crime referrals is by no means representative of 
the true number of cyber dependent crimes which take place 
in the area. Due to issues such as underreporting, or the fact 
that NFIB have not forwarded details of every reported 
crime, the true number is likely to be much greater. 
IV. SURVEY RESULTS 
The survey was completed by 292 individuals from 
across the Force. The initial questions in the survey looked 
to obtain details about the participants based on their rank, 
role, length of service, age, and gender. 
Individuals were then asked about their understanding of 
the terms identified by the College of Policing in the Cyber 
Spectrum, i.e. Cyber Dependent Crime, Cyber Enabled 
Crime, Internet Facilitated Crime and Crime with a Digital 
Footprint. These terms were chosen for inclusion in the 
survey as the College of Policing provides the ‘best practice’ 
for policing in terms of knowledge and training. As such, 
these terms are used within any material issued by the 
College of Policing with regards cyber crime or digital 
investigation.  
The results of this section seem to support the literature 
review in that the many iterations of the definition of cyber 
crime cause confusion (Fig. 2). Very few individuals can 
confidently say they know what any of the crime types (as 
defined in the College of Policing Cyber Spectrum) actually 
are. On average, 15% of individuals feel strongly that they 
understand the meaning of the 4 cyber crime types.  
 
Fig. 2. Attitude of officers & staff with regards their understanding of 
cyber crime definitions 
 
Most individuals feel that they have a limited 
understanding of the definitions, by saying they tend to 
agree they have a good understanding of the terms. 
Although this appears to indicate a good understanding of 
the terms, it may be more a case of an ‘educated guess’. 
Of the definitions where people are less certain about 
their levels of understanding, cyber dependent crime causes 
the most confusion with 36% (n=105) of participants stating 
they have a limited understanding of the definition. Cyber 
dependent crimes are ‘new’ crimes and covered by the 
computer misuse act, and it is these such offences which 
some officers feel require a specialist response. 
Several questions in the survey specifically sought to 
determine the confidence of employees of the Constabulary; 
firstly, around dealing with reports of cyber crime or cyber 
crime investigations, secondly on providing cyber security 
advice to members of the public. These questions were 
posed to better understand the ability of officers and staff to 
deal with reports of cyber crime.  
 
An overwhelming number of individuals (56% n=163) 
state they are simply not confident to deal with cyber crime, 




Fig. 3. Response to the question ‘Are you confident to deal with cyber 
crime?’ 
 
This lack of confidence would likely have a negative 
impact on the employee’s ability to provide a quality service 
to a victim given that they state they regularly deal with 
cyber crime. Despite the fact that officers are trained 
investigators, and other members of police staff such as 
PCSO’s are specifically trained to protect and reassure the 
public and therefore have the ability to deal with cyber 
crime, their lack of confidence will mean they potentially 
offer a substandard service. In practice, the techniques used 
to investigate cyber crime are no different to any other crime 
provided an investigative mind-set is applied. Also, the 
evidence is found in the same places as most traditional 
crimes. What is concerning is that despite this lack of 
confidence, officer and staff workloads will often include 
cyber enabled or dependent crime. 
The responses to the survey suggest that a significant 
cause for the lack of confidence appears to be because of the 
apparent overall lack of training received by officers and 
staff (42%, n=182) as seen in Fig. 4. 
One individual said that: 
“Frontline officers are unskilled in this and are expected to 
be able to investigate or suggest avenues of investigation 
when not only do we have insufficient skills but we do not 
know what the force can actually do” 
The main form of training currently available is in the 
form of online e-learning packages which officers are 
expected to complete themselves. The current cyber crime e-
learning modules provided by the College of Policing are 
not mandatory. Given the lack of confidence in individuals 
in this area of policing, consideration should perhaps be 
given as to whether e-learning is a suitable medium for 
training.  
It is argued that e-Learning has its place and has its 
advantages. Arkorful & Abaidoo suggested that e-learning is 
useful due to the fact that individuals are able to choose the 
time and place they wish to complete their learning [25]. 
Furthermore, e-learning packages allow for users to 
complete the course material at their own pace, in a way 
which is cost effective to the training department or training 
institution due to there being no requirement for paid staff to 
teach the material. 
Others argue however that depsite the apparent 
advantages, e-learning is not suitable, particulary when 
considering a complex subject. Criminal investigation skills 
require a degree of practical experience in order to be able to 
develop understanding. The most significant concern with 
reagrds e-learning is the lack of interaction between a 
learner a teacher or colleague [26]. Face to face interaction 
allows for the exchange and challenge of views and ideas, 
and ensures experiential learning can be used [27]; 
something which is essential in a practtical, skilled 
profession such as policing. 
 
Fig. 4. Why officers and staff aren’t confident to deal with cyber crime 
The survey participants went on to say that they do not 
feel as though they have the appropriate skills, knowledge 
and training.  57% (n=164) of individuals do not feel 
equipped to deal with cyber enabled crime, with slightly 
more, 59% (n=171), ill-equipped to deal with cyber 
dependent crime. 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
Cyber crime is here to stay, and the opportunities for 
criminals will continue to grow as technology advances. 
With this comes the continuing challenge for law 
enforcement agencies to protect members of the public from 
becoming victims and to protect the critical infrastructure of 
the UK and the business that operate within. 
The UK remains a target for cyber criminals, and if it 
remains a key financial and digital hub it will continue to be 
so. However, the UK is responding, putting in place 
safeguards to ensure it remains a safe place for its citizens 
and businesses, and proves to be an ever more hostile place 
for the cybercriminal. However, despite the successful 
national and regional response, issues are highlighted at a 
local level within the 43 police forces. 
This research has highlighted that there is much 
confusion with regards the definitions of cyber crime and 
this has resulted in various issues, such as how cyber crime 
is recorded at a Force level, and ultimately how it affects 
national statistics. This confusion over the definitions of 
cyber crime also affects officers and police staff who are 
expected to identify and investigate cyber crime. Without 
knowing what they are dealing with, they are less confident 
to investigate these offences, and often investigative 
opportunities are missed. 
Haven examined the crime datasets, there is an 
indication that there is potential under-reporting of ‘online 
crimes’, based on the difference between those reported to 
the Home Office and those identified through the MO 
keyword search.  
 
There is also lack of consistency with regards the data 
collated and evaluated by Action Fraud and the National 
Fraud Intelligence Bureau.  As discussed in the literature 
review, there has been some criticism of the way Action 
Fraud and NFIB operate and whether they are fit for 
purpose. The data reviewed seems to support some of these 
views, as do the views of the officers and staff who took part 
in the survey.  
 
Unfortunately, until the issues with Action Fraud and the 
way in which the Home Office choose to collate data on 
cyber crime are resolved, we are likely still to have an 
unclear view of the impact of cyber crime and therefore the 
demand on local law enforcement. 
 
As well as the lack of understanding about cyber crime 
definitions, there are also limited levels of understanding of 
the cyber threats and crime types which local police forces 
are expected to investigate. These offences are seen as being 
complex crimes, requiring a specialist response, despite 
becoming more mainstream.  
Officers and police staff are frustrated at the lack of 
guidance and training issued by the College of Policing, and 
locally. They are aware that cyber crime is on the increase 
and there is an expectation that they will deal with more of 
these crimes in the coming years. Police Officers and Staff 
want to provide the best possible service to members of the 
public during criminal investigations or through providing 
crime prevention advice. Without suitable training, they feel 
that they will not be able to meet the growing demand from 
cyber related crimes. 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research has highlighted key topics and issues, 
some of which could and should be explored further. Based 
on the findings of the research, several recommendations are 
made which could be considered by each local police force, 
as well as nationally. These recommendations are made with 
the view of improving the overall levels of service members 
of the public receive with regards cyber crime, or 
investigations involving digital evidence. 
Firstly, there must be a consistent and multi-faceted 
approach to the training of police officers and police staff, 
with practical examples of how cyber crimes can be 
investigated. This must make use of face-to-face learning 
and could be aided by, but not reliant on, e-learning 
packages. There is also an argument that this training could 
be tailored to suit the needs of different roles within the 
organisation. For example, call takers indicate that they need 
to be able to provide advice on capturing evidence early, and 
providing preventative advice whereas detectives 
conducting investigations need to know how to use digital 
evidence to support their investigations and how to present 
this at court. 
There is a need to clearly define the difference between 
‘Cyber Crime’ and ‘Digital Investigations’. It was found that 
officers and staff sometimes wrongly presume that a crime 
with some form of digital evidence is in fact a cyber crime. 
This isn’t always the case and almost all crimes will have 
some form of digital evidence, whether this is CCTV or 
telecommunications data. 
If Action Fraud is to continue being responsible for 
recording cyber crime statistics, there must be a suitable and 
consistent way of flagging cyber/online crimes locally to 
assist in determining the demand on individual 
organisations. 
There is a need to improve the process by which Action 
Fraud operates. Reported crime figures must be more readily 
available to local police forces so that their demand can be 
measured. Furthermore, Action Fraud needs to provide a 
more timely response to victims, and by working more 
closely with UK Police Forces, the number of crimes being 
investigated needs to increase. Action Fraud also has a key 
role to play in informing members of the public what cyber 
crime is and how it can be reported.  
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